# Week 2: Contact & Conflict in East Asia - Imjin War

**[GP 1] PRESENTATION:** Kenneth M. Swope, “Deceit, Disguise, and Dependence: China, Japan, and the Future of the Tributary System, 1592–1596,” *The International History Review*, 24:4 (2002), 757-782

**(GP 2) Ming Shi-lu**

How far could the laws forbidding sea trade be blamed for the banditry and wako scourge along China’s coasts?

**(GP 3) Nanjung Ilgi & Imjin Changch'o**

To what extent, do you find the diaries of Admiral Yi self-serving? How did the style of his entries fit in with the general East Asian Confucian ethos?

**(GP 4) Hideyoshi, *Letter to king of Korea* (1590); Keinen, *Chōsen hinikki* (1597).**

**& Gilbert, “Admiral Yi Sun-shin, the turtle ship…”**

In this account, what do you think are the contributions of the Chinese? What are the contributions of the Koreans? Why is this so? Comment on the emphasis the Koreans have placed on the importance of Admiral Yi.

What are the reasons Stated by Hideyoshi for his prospective adventure to Korea? How did the foray turn out, according to Keinen?

**[GP 5] *A Korean War Captive in Japan, 1597–1600: The Writings of Kang Hang*, (2013).**

Using a counter intuitive approach, list the reasons why the Koreans failed to repeal the invading Japanese hordes.

* Korea neither has trained officers nor civilians instructed in warfare – peasants were rounded up and made to fight
* Frequent shifts in leadership and postings – same soldier is under the Mobile Inspector in the morning and under the Supreme Field Commander in the evening. Defence commander becomes army commander the next day and vice versa
* Many discordant offices whose orders do not coinicide with one another
* Incorrectly judging potential among generals, officers (Yi Sunsin imprisoned and replaced by Won Kyun)
* Governers not in charge when Japanese arrived and attacked
* Not permitting sons to take the place of their fathers
* Dismissing good soldiers upon the first rumor
* Did not provide for need of Generals – land, women – so they extorted their own soldiers
* Didn’t use people who fled, lost their homes, to cultivate fertile land for army
* “The young and strong among them can be trained as soldiers, while the income from the land can be used for military expenditures.”

“Officers and soldiers will increase in number, provisions for them will grow, warships will be maintained, the people’s livelihood will be secured, and the state will not have to worry about transporting provisions to them by boat.”

* Killing Japanese who surrender rather than making them work, make swords

“If they are stealthily sent to battlefields accompanied by interpreters to induce other Japanese to surrender, they will be able to lure tens or hundreds of them daily. Thus, not only by plucking the feathers and fur will [their strength] gradually decrease to a nadir, but also in daily encounters we can attack their weakness with what we plucked from them and with our own strength”

**[OPTIONAL]**

**Glahn, “Fountain of Fortune…”**

In what ways did a silver economy contributed to the situation in the Imjin War?

**Swope, “Crouching tigers, secret weapons…”**

What does this article tell you about the technology transfer? To what extent, is it accurate to credit the technology of the Chinese to their success in the Imjin War?